In this paper we study the coordination of inventory control in divergent multi-echelon inventory systems under periodic review and decentralized control. Under decentralized control the installations decide upon replenishment policies that minimize their individual inventory costs. In general these policies do not coincide with the optimal policies of the system under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. We present a simple coordination mechanism that removes this cost inefficiency. The upstream installations increases its base stock level while the downstream installations compensate their supplier for increased costs and provide it with additional side payments. We show that this mechanism coordinates the system; the global optimal policy of the system is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, the mechanism results in a fair allocation of the costs; all installations enjoy cost savings.
Introduction
In this paper we study the coordination of inventory control in divergent multiechelon inventory systems under periodic review. The stockpoints in such a system In the Netherlands, the 3 universities of technology have formed the 3TU.Federation. This article is the result of joint research in the 3TU.Centre of Competence NIRICT (Netherlands Institute for Research on ICT). track echelon inventories and their inventory is controlled by replenishment policies. Often, these stockpoints are managed independently, that is, the system is under decentralized control. Then each stockpoint decides upon a replenishment policy that minimizes its individual inventory costs. Doing so, the stockpoints neglect the external effects of their decisions upon the other parties in the system. This results in larger total costs compared to the system under centralized control. Further, the decisions are not globally optimal for the inventory system, that is, they do not coincide with the optimal decisions under centralized control.
To overcome this cost inefficiency, one could consider the system under centralized control. Then a central planner minimizes the total cost of the system and instructs all the stockpoints about the decisions they should take to achieve this global minimum. However, in practice stockpoints in an inventory system are not willing to give up their independence just like that.
Alternatively, coordination between the parties involved may overcome the cost inefficiency. A coordination mechanism operates under decentralized control, and it changes the incentives of the stockpoints. These changes should be such that the new decisions of the stockpoints coincide with the global optimal decisions under centralized control. Then the inventory system is coordinated. Further, the coordination mechanism should result in a fair allocation of the costs. Fair means that all stockpoints should enjoy cost savings compared to the initial situation under decentralized control. In this paper we introduce and analyse a mechanism that coordinates the inventory system and results in a fair allocation of the costs.
In the literature, inventory systems are studied extensively. We focus on divergent multi-echelon inventory systems, also named distribution or production systems, under periodic review. In Diks and De Kok (1998) these systems are studied under centralized control. They consider a fixed lead time, stochastic demand, linear inventory costs, and penalty costs for backorders. Their main result is that the optimal replenishment policy for each stockpoint can be determined by system decomposition, in which the system is decomposed into one-dimensional problems. Inventory systems with periodic review have many practical applications, like spare parts management (Lonchampt 2012) , and cash management (Baker et al. 2013) .
It is recognized in the literature that decentralized control leads to larger costs for divergent multi-echelon inventory systems. Several papers study coordination mechanisms to overcome this. Often, game theory is used as a tool to study these mechanisms. Homberger (2011) introduces a new generic mechanism for coordination of a group of independent decision makers under asymmetric information. Experiments show that this mechanism is effective to determine fair cost distributions. Seliaman and Ahmad (2008) consider a three-stage supply chain involving suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. Coordination is achieved as follows: within a stage the same cycle time is adopted, and this cycle time is an integer multiple of the cycle time used at the adjacent downstream stage. This mechanism is shown to have low costs.
Inventory systems under periodic review are also studied in Zijm and Timmer (2008) . The authors focus on serial and distribution inventory systems under decentralized control. A coordination mechanism is introduced in which, among others, the retailers compensate the supplier for cost increases. It is shown that this mechanism coordinates the system. Furthermore, this mechanism has lower costs for all the firms compared to the situation under decentralized control.
Recently, several excellent surveys and books on coordination in supply chains have been published; see among others (Glock 2012; Leng and Zhu 2009; Ö zer 2011) . In their survey, Leng and Zhu remark that in most papers the mechanisms achieve coordination of the supply chain, however ''very few publications considered the 'fair' allocation of extra profit or cost savings generated by the coordination, so that all supply chain members are better off than in the noncooperative context'' (Leng and Zhu 2009, p. 602) . Our paper can be added to this small list of publications since we consider both coordination and fair cost allocation.
More precisely, in this paper we study the multi-echelon inventory system of Diks and De Kok (1998) but now under decentralized control. To overcome the resulting cost inefficiency compared to the system under centralized control, we introduce a simple coordination mechanism that will result in a fair allocation of the costs. This mechanism is inspired by the mechanism in Zijm and Timmer (2008) . We show that this mechanism coordinates the supply chain, that is, the global optimal policy of the inventory system is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, the coordination mechanism results in a fair allocation of the costs; all installations enjoy cost savings compared to the situation before coordination.
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. Our mechanism (i) coordinates the inventory system, and (ii) results in a fair allocation of the costs. Besides, our mechanism is a generalisation of the mechanism in Zijm and Timmer (2008) in two ways. First, the system under consideration allows for unequal holding and penalty costs among the installations. Second, in this work we consider the coordination of a system with at least three stages.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce our model. The inventory system under decentralized control is analyzed in Sect. 3. Thereafter, in Sect. 4 we introduce and study our coordination mechanism. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are presented in the ''Appendix''.
Model
Our model is based on the model of Diks and De Kok (1998) , which they studied under centralized control. In the next section we study this model with tools from game theory in a decentralized setting. We present these tools at the end of this section.
We consider a single-item three-stage divergent inventory system, which is a system where each stockpoint has a unique supplier. See Fig. 1 for an example.
Denote the unique supplier or preceding stockpoint of stockpoint i by pre(i). Note that we use the terms stockpoint and installation interchangeably. Let V i be the set of all stockpoints that are directly supplied by i.
An echelon is a set of stockpoints starting from a certain installation and including all stockpoints downstream, that is, toward the end-stockpoints that try to meet customer demand. Denote by e(i) the echelon starting from installation i. The echelon stock of e(i) consists of the stock at stockpoint i plus all stock in transition to or on hand at any installation downstream minus eventual backlogs at the endstockpoints. The echelon inventory position of e(i) is the echelon stock of e(i) plus materials that are ordered but not yet delivered at stockpoint i, the most upstream stockpoint in the echelon.
The stockpoints use periodic review policies to control their inventories. Each period, a stockpoint uses its echelon inventory position to decide upon the replenishment of its stock. For this, stockpoint i uses a so-called base stock level y i ; each period the stockpoint issues an order of replenishment that raises the echelon inventory position to y i . Because the firms track echelon inventories, the base stock level of stockpoint i is at least equal to the total base stock level of all the stockpoints it supplies, y i ! P n2V i y n : Also, P n2V i y n is the demand for stockpoint i each period. Let D i ¼ y i À P n2V i y n be the physical stock at stockpoint i. The sequence of events in each period is as follows. First, the echelon inventory levels are observed. Second, replenishment orders are placed according to the base stock levels used. Third, the order of stockpoint i placed L i periods in the past arrives. Fourth, demand of this period is revealed, and is fulfilled or backlogged.
Stockpoint 1, the most upstream stockpoint in the system, orders to an outside supplier who always has sufficient stock. Any other stockpoint i orders at its supplier pre(i) in the system. The order of stockpoint i arrives after a lead time of L i periods, where L i is a fixed integer number. If this order arrives, two cases can occur. If the Fig. 1 An example of a three-stage divergent inventory system with 9 stockpoints. Here, e(4) = {4, 7, 8, 9} is the echelon starting from stockpoint 4. E = {2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} are the endstockpoints. U 7 = {1,4} are the stockpoints on the path from the outside-supplier to stockpoint 7. Stockpoint 3 operates at level LLC(3) = 2 echelon stock x is larger than the demand for installation i then this demand is fulfilled, and any remaining stock is kept at stockpoint i for future use. Otherwise, the echelon stock is rationed according to allocation functions z j ðxÞ; j 2 V i : These functions efficiently distribute the available stock, P j2V i z j ðxÞ ¼ x; in nonnegative quantities, z j (x) C 0 for all j. The allocation functions are also defined if the echelon stock x equals the demand, x ¼ P n2V j y n : Then each installation receives its requested amount: z j ð P n2V j y n Þ ¼ y j : This is used in the coordination mechanism. Let E denote the set of end-stockpoints and M the set of the other (intermediate) stockpoints. Define by U i the set of stockpoints on the path from the outside supplier to stockpoint i. Notice that U 1 = ;: Also, a low level code (LLC) is assigned to every stockpoint. This code shows the level in the supply chain where the stockpoint operates, counted from the most downstream stockpoints. So an end-stockpoint n 2 E has LLC(n) = 1, an intermediate stockpoint i 2 M has LLCðiÞ ¼ 1 þ max j2V i LLCðjÞ: In our three-stage model, stockpoint 1 has LLC(1) = 3.
Without loss of generality we assume that customer demand only occurs in the end-stockpoints. During a period, demands for end-stockpoints may be correlated but demands across periods are independent and identically distributed. The stochastic demand for stockpoint i during a single period has cumulative density function F i and expected value l i . By F i (L) we denote the cumulative density function of the demand for i during L periods with expected value Ll i , and realization u i (L) , where L is an integer number. Any demand that cannot be satisfied immediately is backordered and it incurs a penalty cost of p i per unit backordered per period. Stockpoint i pays a holding cost h i þ P j2U i h j per unit of stock per period; the cost component h i is the additional holding cost arising from the increase in value of the item at stockpoint i.
A policy of an echelon prescribes for all stockpoints in the echelon its base stock level and allocations functions; for the end-stockpoints it prescribes their base stock levels. This policy is denoted by a pair ðy i ; W i Þ; in which W i summarizes the parameters downstream of stockpoint i :
Preliminary results
We start with a brief analysis of the costs of the system under centralized control. Diks and De Kok (1998) allocate the one-period costs C i (x) to installation i. These are the expected costs incurred at stockpoint i if its echelon stock at the beginning of the period is increased to x. For intermediate stockpoints it is the holding cost of the remaining inventory, and for end-stockpoints it is the holding cost for goods on stock and the penalty cost in case of a shortage, that is, if demand exceeds the stock level x.
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This expression follows from Lemma 1 in Diks and De Kok (1998) . By Lemma 2 in Diks and De Kok (1998) , the expected cost D i ðy i ; W i Þ of echelon i given the policy ðy i ; W i Þ consists of the cost of stockpoint i and the costs of its successors. These latter costs depend on whether or not stockpoint i has sufficient stock to satisfy all the demands from its successors.
Let w n denote the base stock level as experienced by installation n. This may differ from the desired base stock level y n . However, w 1 = y 1 since the outside supplier always has ample stock to supply stockpoint 1. Further, the demand y n of stockpoint n is fulfilled if its supplier i, i = pre(n) has ample stock, w i À u ðL i Þ i ! P m2V i y m ; and otherwise his experienced base stock level is an allocated part of installation i's stock,
( Occasionally we write w n ðu ðL i Þ i Þ to stress the dependence of w n on u ðL i Þ i : Also, let E denote the expectation. These notations allow for an easy formulation of the average cost of the system.
Lemma 1 The average cost of echelon 1 equals
This lemma says that the average cost of echelon 1 is the sum of the expected holding cost for stockpoint 1 after receiving its replenishment order after L 1 periods, and the expected costs for the stockpoints it supplies. Further, the average cost of echelon i, LLC(i) = 2 consists of the holding costs for the inventory of this stockpoint and the expected costs of the stockpoints it supplies. Finally, the average cost of end-stockpoint n consists of its holding and penalty cost, with a correction for the situation when it receives an allocated part of its supplier.
The proof of this Lemma, as well as all subsequent proofs, can be found in the ''Appendix''.
The cost D 1 ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ of the inventory system is minimized in the global optimal replenishment policy, denoted by ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ (Diks and De Kok 1998) . This optimum can easily be implemented in a system under centralized control.
Strategic games
In this paper we analyse how the inventory system behaves under decentralized control. Then each stockpoint decides about its private base stock level y i and allocation functions z j ; j 2 V i : Once these decisions are made, they are implemented over an infinite horizon. A suitable tool to analyse such a situation is by means of a (noncooperative) strategic game; see for example (Peters 2008; Tijs 2003) . Each player in such a game chooses a strategy; this is done independently and simultaneously from the other players. Thereafter, each player incurs a cost that depends on the strategies chosen by all the players.
In more detail, a strategic game consists of a set of players, and for each player a strategy set and a cost function. Here, the stockpoints are the players. Player i's strategy set, i 2 M; is the set of all pairs ðy i ; [ j2V i z j Þ of echelon base stock levels y i , and allocation functions z j ; j 2 V i : For end-stockpoints i 2 E the strategy set only contains the feasible echelon base stock levels y i . Notice that a policy ðy i ; W i Þ represents the strategies chosen by all the players in e(i). Therefore, in the sequel, we also refer to a player's strategy as his policy. The cost function of player i depends on the strategies chosen by all players, and will be specified in Sects. 3 and 4. The goal of each player is to choose a strategy that minimizes its cost.
A Nash equilibrium is a solution of a strategic game. The strategies ð" y 1 ; " W 1 Þ are called a Nash equilibrium if individual deviations cannot decrease the costs:
where the superscript -i denotes that all parameters remain unchanged except for player i's strategy.
System under decentralized control
In this section we study our inventory system under decentralized control. If the stock level at the beginning of the period is x, then the one-period costC n ðxÞ of stockpoint n 2 E under decentralized control equals holding costs for goods in stock and penalty costs for backlogs,
x p n ðu À xÞdF n ðuÞ:
The expected costD n ðy n Þ per period for end-stockpoint n with base stock level y n is the expected one-period cost of stockpoint n after receipt of its order after L n periods, Divergent multi-echelon inventory systems 1005 D n ðy n Þ ¼ Z 1 0C n ðy n À uÞdF ðL n Þ n ðuÞ:
Define the cost functionH i ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ of player i to be its expected cost given the strategies ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ chosen by all the players. Because player n 2 E experiences base stock level w n , its expected cost per period isH n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ ¼ ED n ðw n Þ: For players i 2 M the expected costH i ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ consists of two parts. The first part represents the holding costs for goods in stock, if any, taking into account its replenishment leadtime L i . The second part represents the holding costs for goods in transit to installations n 2 V i it serves, taking into account their leadtimes L n .
These cost functions have simpler expressions, as shown below.
Lemma 2 The expected costs arẽ
for intermediate stockpoints i 2 M; and H n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ ¼ ED n ðw n Þ þ X j2U n h j ðEw n À ðL n þ 1Þl n Þ for end-stockpoints n 2 E:
Hence, for an intermediate stockpoint, the expected costs are holding costs for the expected experienced inventory level, and for goods in transit to the stockpoints that it supplies. For end-stockpoints, the expected costs are equal to the costs under centralized control for the experienced base stock level w n with a correction for the holding cost of the experienced stock level.
Using these expressions we can relate the total cost per echelon to its cost under centralized control.
Lemma 3 The total costH eðiÞ ¼ P j2eðiÞH j of echelon i equals
So, the total cost per echelon under decentralized control equals the cost of the echelon under centralized control up to a correction for the holding cost of stockpoint i.
We obtain as a corollary that the expected cost of echelon 1 under decentralized control equals its cost under centralized control.
Corollary 4H eð1Þ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ ¼ D 1 ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ:
Based on the inventory system under decentralized control, we define a strategic game. Stockpoint (player) i in this game has cost functionH i ; and it chooses a strategy that minimizes its expected cost. These choices result in a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 5 In the strategic game with cost functionsH i ; the installations select a policy ðy Ã 1 ; W Ã 1 Þ that satisfies y Ã i ¼ P j2V i y Ã j for i 2 M; and where y n * minimizes H n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ for n 2 E: This is a Nash equilibrium of this strategic game.
According to this theorem, in an equilibrium policy ðy Ã 1 ; W Ã 1 Þ all intermediate stockpoints keep their base stock levels as small as possible: y Ã i ¼ P j2V i y Ã j : Because of this, the end-stockpoints n 2 E incur large costs due to large probabilities of stock-out at their suppliers. Furthermore, according to this theorem there are no restrictions on the allocation functions in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for each player any choice of allocation functions is optimal. This implies that there exist multiple Nash equilibria.
Coordination mechanism
In this section we introduce our coordination mechanism for the inventory system under decentralized control. The goal of this mechanism is to reduce the costs for the stockpoints, compared to the large costs under the Nash equilibrium ðy Ã 1 ; W Ã 1 Þ; and to induce the stockpoints to select the global optimal policy.
The coordination mechanism works as follows. First, negotiations between the two most downstream stages change the costs of the stockpoints in these stages. Second, negotiations between the two most upstream stages change the costs of stockpoint 1 and the echelons downstream. These changes in the costs imply that the optimal strategy for the stockpoints is to select the optimal policy under centralized control (Theorem 8). Finally, a feedback round distributes the costs of the echelons involved in the second round. The use of this mechanism results in a coordinated inventory system, and a fair allocation of the cost of the system among the stockpoints (Theorem 10).
First round of negotiations
Under decentralized control any end-stockpoint n is confronted with large costs due to a high probability of stock-outs for its supplier. This follows from the fact that the supplier maintains a minimal base stock level, see Theorem 5. To reduce their costs, the end-stockpoints will start negotiations with their immediate suppliers. During these negotiations we assume that the strategies of the other stockpoints in the system remain equal to the Nash equilibrium strategies.
The end-stockpoints ask their supplier, i with LLC(i) = 2, to increase its base stock level y i to, say, y i [ P n2V i y n : This results in a cost increase for stockpoint i of sizeH
the difference between its new cost under the increased base stock level, and the cost of the Nash equilibrium policy. The installations in V i in turn will compensate stockpoint i for this increase. In particular, installation n 2 V i will pay
This is the expected holding cost of the extra amount received by installation n if the supplier would always distribute the quantity w i À u ðL i Þ i according to the allocation function z n instead of supplying w n . These payments leave installation i indifferent to cooperation since now its cost is equal to its cost under the Nash equilibrium policy. To persuade installation i to participate, it should receive an additional payment since then its new cost is lower than its initial cost. For this, installation n will transfer a fraction c i of its surplus-its cost savings due to the increased base stock level of i minus its compensation paid to i-to i:
for all stockpoints n that are supplied by i. These negotiations lead to the following new costs. The new cost H 0 n for installation n 2 V i resulting from these negotiations, consist of its original costH n ; and the compensation (2) and the fraction of its surplus paid to its supplier i (3).
Similarly, the new cost H i 0 for installation i consist of its original costH i reduced by the compensations (2) and the fractions of the surpluses (3) it receives of the stockpoints it supplies.
Notice that the cost functions H 0 are a reallocation of the cost functionsH :
the negotiations rearrange the cost within the echelon. Upon minimizing these new cost functions H 0 , the installations select the following strategies.
Theorem 6 In the first round of the negotiations the policy ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ is chosen by the installations. Here, installation n 2 V i minimizes its cost H 0 n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ in its optimal base stock level under centralized control, y a n ¼ŷ n ; and installation i minimizes its cost H 0 i ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ in y a i 6 ¼ŷ i and z a n 6 ¼ẑ n ; n 2 V i : Hence, due to the negotiations the end-stockpoints select their optimal base stock levels under centralized control. Their suppliers select another policy.
These negotiations also reduce the costs.
Theorem 7 The negotiations in the first round reduce costs: H 0 j ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ \H j ðy Ã 1 ; W Ã 1 Þ for all installations j in echelon i. So, the policy ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ is preferred by all parties involved in the negotiations because it results in lower costs than before the negotiations.
Second round of negotiations
In the second round of negotiations the stockpoints i with LLC(i) = 2 negotiate with their supplier, stockpoint 1. So, the negotiations take place between installation 1 and all installations i 2 V 1 : We assume that the strategies of the stockpoints not involved in these negotiations remain unchanged: y n ¼ y a n ð¼ŷ n Þ for all n 2 V i as determined by the previous round of negotiations. We assume that each installation i 2 V 1 participates on behalf of its echelon because the negotiations also have impact on the costs of the other installations in the echelon. Among others, cost savings for installation i result in lower compensations from installations n 2 V i to i; we deal with this in the feedback round.
The second round of negotiations proceeds among similar lines as the first round. All installations i 2 V 1 ask stockpoint 1 to increase its base stock level y 1 to some level y 1 [ P i2V i y i : The resulting cost increase for installation 1 is
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to installation 1. This is the expected holding cost of the extra amount received by installation i if stockpoint 1 would always distribute the quantity y 1 À u ðL 1 Þ 1 using the allocation function instead of supplying w i . These compensations by its buyers leave installation 1 indifferent to cooperation because its cost is the same as before this negotiation. To persuade installation 1 to participate, it receives a fraction c 1 of the surplus of echelon i; i 2 V 1 ; c 1HeðiÞ ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ ÀH eðiÞ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ À h 1 Eðz i ðy 1 À u
where Eq. (6) is used. These payments result in new costs H eðiÞ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ for echelon i, namely its former costs H 0 eðiÞ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ increased by the compensation (7) and the part of its surplus (8) paid to stockpoint 1:
The new cost H 1 ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ of stockpoint 1 is its former costH 1 ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ reduced by the compensation (7) and the part of the surplus (8) it receives from each echelon i 2 V 1 ;
c 1 ðH eðiÞ ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ ÀH eðiÞ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ À h 1 Eðz i ðy 1 À u
Each installation minimizes its costs H. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 8 In the second round of negotiations the global optimal policy ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ is chosen by the installations: echelon i minimizes its cost H eðiÞ ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ in ðŷ i ;Ŵ i Þ; and stockpoint 1 minimizes its cost H 1 ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ in ðŷ 1 ; fẑ i g i2V 1 Þ:
Thus, after the second round of negotiations the inventory system is coordinated because the stockpoints select the global optimal policy ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ:
Theorem 9 The negotiations in the second round reduce costs: H 1 ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ\H 1 ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ and H eðiÞ ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ\H 0 eðiÞ ðy a 1 ; W a 1 Þ for all echelons i 2 V 1 :
:
Notice that 0\c i \1: This immediately implies our main result:
Theorem 10 Consider the strategic game corresponding to the coordination mechanism. So, with cost function H i for installation i if i = 1 or i 2 V 1 \ E; and cost function H 0 i otherwise. Further, installation i with LLC(i) = 2 also pays the compensation (7) and part of the surplus (8) to stockpoint 1. If c i [ c i for i with LLC(i) = 2, then the global optimal policy ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. Further, this Nash equilibrium is a fair cost allocation; all stockpoints enjoy cost savings.
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Hence, due to the coordination mechanism the inventory system is coordinated because installations choose the global optimal replenishment policy ðŷ 1 ;Ŵ 1 Þ: Further, all stockpoints enjoy cost savings compared to the initial situation under decentralized control with costsH i :
Conclusions
In this paper a coordination mechanism for divergent multi-echelon inventory systems under periodic review and under decentralized control is presented and analysed. For ease of notation we studied a three-echelon system. Our coordination mechanism can readily be extended to general divergent N-echelon inventory systems. In that case, it will have N -1 rounds of negotiations (between the stages 1 and 2, up to the stages N -1 and N), and N -2 feedback rounds (between stages N -1 and N -2, continuing to stages 2 and 1).
The decentralized control implies that the echelon base stock levels set by the installations need not be optimal from the perspective of the supply chain as a whole. The selfish installations act in their own self interest, which conflicts with global interests. A coordination mechanism is introduced to align the interests of the installations. The mechanism starts from the equilibrium outcome under decentralized control. In this equilibrium outcome the most downstream installations incur the largest costs. Therefore, these stockpoints initiate negotiations with their supplier with the goal of decreasing their costs.
During the negotiations a mechanism is employed that is based upon two ideas: first, upstream installations should be fully compensated for cost increases due to larger base stock levels, and second, they should also receive a part of the surplus of the downstream installations. The mechanism changes the incentives in such a way that the global optimal policy is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Hence, the system is coordinated. This result is due to the monetary side payments in the mechanism, which not only reduce the cost of the upstream installations but result in lower costs for all installations. Hence, the final cost allocation is a fair allocation. This is important for the acceptance of the mechanism by all installations.
The coordination mechanism has several desirable characteristics. First, the mechanism induces the upstream installation to carry inventory since the extra costs of this inventory will be reimbursed. Second, the monetary side payments redistribute the costs among the installations, so the cost of the system is preserved. Third, the mechanism is designed for implementation in systems with multiple independent stockpoints, which are more complex than systems in which all stockpoints belong to a single company. Finally, the resulting cost allocation is fair-all installations enjoy cost savings due to the mechanism.
Along similar lines, for stockpoints i with LLC(i) = 2
Finally,
for n 2 E \ V i :
Proof of Lemma 2 The cost for stockpoint n 2 E;H n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ ¼ ED n ðw n Þ; follows fromD n ðy n Þ ¼ D n ðy n Þ þ P j2U n h j ðy n À ðL n þ 1Þl n Þ: For installation i with LLC(i) = 2 we derive 
where Lemma 2 and the induction assumption are used in the second equality. The third equality uses P k2U j h k ¼ h m þ P k2U m h k ; P j2V m l j ¼ l m ; and the final equality follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 5 Stockpoint i 2 M has costH i ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ as specified in Lemma 2. Notice that Ew i À L i l i À P n2V i Ew n ! 0 because firms track echelon inventories, and P n2V i h i þ P m2U i h m L n l n are fixed costs. As a consequence minimal costs are reached if y Ã i ¼ P n2V i y Ã n since then Ew i À L i l i À P n2V i Ew n ¼ 0: Notice that this minimum does not depend on z n .
Simultaneously, end-stockpoint n minimizes its costH n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ: By Lemma 2, the first order condition for a minimum is
where D 0 n ðy n Þ ¼ d dy n D n ðy n Þ: Therefore D 0 n ðy n Þ þ P j2U n h j ¼ 0 because F ðL i Þ i ðD i Þ is outside of the control of stockpoint n. Using (1), we derive D 0 n ðy n Þ þ X j2U n h j ¼ h n þ X j2U n h j þ p n ! F ðL n þ1Þ n ðy n Þ À p n :
So, an end-stockpoint n selects its base stock level y n * such that F ðL n þ1Þ n ðy Ã n Þ ¼ p n =ðh n þ h 1 þ p n Þ: One easily checks that the second order condition for a minimum is satisfied. h
Proof of Theorem 6 Minimizing H 0 n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ with respect to y n is equivalent to minimizingH n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ þ ðh i þ h 1 ÞEðz n ðw i À u ðL i Þ i Þ À w n Þ because the other terms in H 0 n are constant. Becausẽ H n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ þ ðh i þ h 1 ÞEðz n ðw i À u ðL i Þ i Þ À w n Þ ¼ ED n ðw n Þ þ X j2U n h j ! ðEw n À ðL n þ 1Þl n Þ þ ðh i þ h 1 ÞEðz n ðw i À u ðL i Þ i Þ À w n Þ ¼ ED n ðw n Þ þ ðh i þ h 1 ÞðEz n ðw i À u ðL i Þ i Þ À ðL n þ 1Þl n Þ;
minimizing H 0 n ðy 1 ; W 1 Þ with respect to y n boils down to minimizing ED n ðw n Þ: Using Lemma 1, the first order condition for a minimum is 0 ¼ d dy n D n ðy n Þ þ D n z n X We compare this to the allocated cost for echelon i under centralized control (1),
